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## EUROMAYDAN IS A TEST FOR THE EU AND CALL FOR RUSSIA

EU enlargement to the borders of the former Soviet Union posed a problem to him building a new system of relations with the post-sovet countries. Thus, there is a problem in the development of a new strategy for implementation of the EU Eastern Policy. This problem determined by the new historical and political circumstances. **Firstly**, ran his term action agreement on partnership and cooperation, which could no longer serve as a new foreign policy objective of the EU. **Secondly**, European integration has collapsed EU strategy on Russia. Brussels hoped that the integration of Russia into Europe automatically entail and its satellites – post-Soviet countries. But Russia has rejected these payments and started to consider the European Union as a geopolitical rival. First, Moscow has refused to participate in the Neighborhood Policy, Brussels proposed for neighboring countries. For Moscow, this proposal appeared to be insulting, as it put on a par with other minor countries along with Morocco, Moldova and Ukraine, and others.

Trying of Brussels to consider relationship with the Russian Federation as a separate area of Eastern EU policy also not successful. The the EU's intention to create with Russia Four Common Spaces for strengthening cooperation in economy, freedom, homeland security, justice, external security, science, education and culture threatened the Putin's authoritarian regime. The latter version of the EU policy in relations with Russia provides for implementation of the concept of «Partnership for modernization in relations with Russia.» But it raised the question: Why upgrade? Upgrade authoritarian Putin regime? Do modernization of the Russian economy militarized for future military expansion? On what ideological basis of this partnership will take place: at the European democratic or authoritarian values?

Worsening relations to a state of conflict has forced the European Union to build a new East European countries separate from Russia strategy. It was the program «Eastern Partnership». The idea of the Eastern Partnership seemed compromise in EU's relationship with Russia. What this seems to compromise in terms of the EU? On the one hand, the European Union seems to recognize the reality that the countries covered by the Eastern Partnership are in the area of influence. European officials are constantly repeated that the Eastern Partnership is not against Russia, referring to Russia's reaction to NATO enlargement. Russia also sees this initiative as an encroachment of the EU to the Russian sphere of influence. Why? Because, implementing the Eastern Partnership, the EU seeks to save the European orientation of the parties are in Russian «zone.» The Eastern Partnership aims to support internal transformations of a partners to the direction of the relationship with the EU. I such way the EU will want to protect itself against external threats and challenges on its eastern border. This is actually spread influence through «soft power» (Soft Power). Thus, objectively «Eastern Partnership» will help these countries attempt to weaken Russia's influence on them. Although it should be noted that the concept of the four common spaces proposed by the European Union within the framework of the strategic partnership provides more opportunities for the convergence of EU and Russia than these four platforms are in the Eastern Partnership initiative for six countries – participants<sup>1</sup>.

The basis of the “Eastern Partnership” was put value-normative approach based on the competitive advantages of the EU to Russia. The program “Eastern Partnership” provides a flexible mechanism that takes into account the heterogeneity of the six partner countries and very different levels of integration, where each of these countries as a result of plans to achieve convergence with the EU. “Eastern Partnership” in comparison with Russian geopolitical project represented the country fairly liberal conditions for integration under which each of them had the right to choose to participate in these projects in accordance with their own national interests. In this context, the “Eastern Partnership” covered the broader context of the goals, motivations and forms of cooperation. Its peculiarity was that it was designed to support reforms in the economy, political system, a society where Russian geopolitical projects do not provide.

The main purpose of the “Eastern Partnership” as stated in the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit is to discuss the conditions necessary to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries. In this context,

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<sup>1</sup> H. Perepelycja, *Novi instrumenty Shidnoho Partnerstva i mozhlivosti dlja krajini-uthasnych*, „International Review”, VII 2009, p. 44.

the program should promote stability and multilateral confidence building. Thus, the “Eastern Partnership” in the EUs’ plan to Ukraine sought to create a kind of stability zone on the eastern borders of the European Union and avoid dividing lines that formed the introduction of the Schengen area and Russia’s claims to its exclusive interests in Ukraine.

The implementation of the “Eastern Partnership” as a competitive strategy in comparison with the claims of Russia, was supposed to carry through a series of specific tools, which are mainly: the new Association Agreement, including a deep and comprehensive agreements on free trade for those countries that willing and ready to take appropriate far-reaching commitments with the EU; comprehensive program funded by the EU to improve administrative simplification – IMD partner countries; gradual integration into the EU economy (with the asymmetry required economies of partner countries), including legal obligations of the approximation of the regulations; encourage partner countries to develop the network of free trade between them; conclusion of “mobility and security agreements”<sup>2</sup> that facilitate simpler legitimate crossing the EU, while ensuring measures to combat corruption, organized crime and illegal migration.

The use of the entire set of instruments was carried out within the legal title to the obligations set out in the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. Implementation Strategy “Eastern Partnership” was based on the principle of conditionality of the preceding claims, as a condition of signing the Agreement or its performance, while Russia offered membership in the Customs Union, the Eurasian or without any demands.

Thus, the principle of conditionality defined requirement as an incentive to cooperate, rather than as a voluntary incentive. This principle is laid in relations between Ukraine and the EU purely formal technological approach. In fact, the Ukrainian side, this meant unilateral commitments without incentives. The advantage of implementing such a strategy were manifest only in the longer term. In contrast to the long-awaited results of the Russian reintegration projects promised rapid and short-term benefits.

Thus, the principle of conditionality does not meet the interests of the political class in Ukraine, which had an interest in maintaining the existing kleptocratic authoritarian system, but not change it. Political reform, implementation of which was one of the special requirements of the Association Agreement is ultimately meant a radical change in the system. The Russian integration projects, however, guarantee the preservation of the authoritarian system. The divergence of political interests led to different ideas about European integration. The political elite of Ukraine for political goals put the country’s membership in the EU,

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 44–45.

rather than internal reforms, while Strategy «Eastern Partnership», by contrast, was focused on internal reforms in the country outside the membership. This is also due to the declarative nature of the European integration of Ukraine, the main efforts in the implementation of which was entrusted to the diplomatic corps, while officials of other departments of European integration, this activity was not carried out binding.

Therefore, the political elite of Ukraine did not consider the requirements of the EU as being enforceable. This evident is how President Viktor Yanukovich and his entourage ignored «Fule requirements» on the terms of the Association Agreement. As noted in its publication analyst Catharine Volchuk – «none of the state officials had not been delivered reprimand for improper fulfillment of the requirements for the association.»<sup>3</sup>.

Another fundamental principle of the Strategy of «Eastern Partnership» was to adapt and convergence of rules and regulations to the European legislation. The complexity of its implementation on Ukraine was the fact that the adoption of regulations, let alone use, do not take into account the cost of risks arising for Ukrainian business as a result of this convergence. From the introduction of rules EU technical regulations won only actors SME whose products have low added value. This gave them the opportunity to be competitive in the EU market. At the same time, the costs of big business and heavy industry, machine building, oriented by the Russian market, from going to the EU technical regulations that were three times higher issued so great that they were losing their competitiveness in the European market, and therefore strongly trying to maintain their position in the CIS. It is this segment of big business the eastern regions of Ukraine was the most represented in the ruling «Party of Regions», which together with the communists played the largest covert opposition to European integration processes, although declared official support for European integration course.

Thus, the lack of sufficient incentives from the EU for the subjects of heavy industry and engineering – the most powerful actors in specific policy areas – making them enemies of the Agreement. To a large extent this has become a major cause of failure of the strategy of «Eastern Partnership» for Ukraine. Lack of incentives for EU membership, which were candidate countries for membership, forcing the Polish researcher K. Volchuk concluded that «Results of the convergence in the EU has only an indirect effect»<sup>4</sup> and will not lead to sustained process of convergence. These difficult conditions are a significant problem for Europeanization beyond.

<sup>3</sup> J. Langbein, K. Wolczuk, *Convergence without membership? The impact of the European Union in the neighbourhood: evidence from Ukraine*, „Journal of European Public Policy”, 2012, 19:6, p. 873.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 878.

Another, an internal problem of implementing the EU's strategy for Ukraine is that the EU is not monolithic with respect to Ukraine, and then he finally decided what to do with the Eastern Partnership. The old member states such as Germany and France, this time looking at the Kyiv through the prism of his dialogue with Moscow. They do not want too annoying for Russia, Ukraine, afraid to break their own economic and security interests.

November 26th, 2013 Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov after several meetings with Russian Prime Minister Medvedev, during a press conference with foreign journalists, announced its intention to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU at the request of<sup>5</sup>. Previously, official Kyiv informed of the requirement to EU give Ukraine 160 billion euros in compensation for probable losses during the implementation of EU technical standards, the Agreement on free trade. And the money can not be due to any obligations of Kyiv. Earlier Azarov said that the summit of «Eastern Partnership» in Vilnius, President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich intends to raise the issue of consultation Ukraine, Russia and the EU on Kyiv signing of the Association Agreement with the EU.

Obviously, the rejection of Ukraine and Armenia before from the Association Agreement, V. Putin dealt a devastating blow to the Vilnius summit of «Eastern Partnership» buried indefinitely the implementation of the European project for the post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe. Thus, the EU's Eastern policy failed. The Victory of V. Putin at the Vilnius summit has created all necessary conditions for absorption in the region, which was previously considered a buffer zone and created a strategic base for further offensive against the whole of Europe. The purpose of this attack is to review the results of the Cold War in Europe and the restoration of Russian geopolitical domination of the continent. In a global context, as it would allow Russia to destroy the entire World order that emerged after the Cold War and to restore Russia's status as a world power, able to manage global processes.

The European Union, by contrast, as a result of the geopolitical defeat lost the ability to influence the country's «Eastern Partnership» and the program itself «Eastern Partnership» was, it seems, completely destroyed. As a result of this defeat, the European Union and NATO failed to create a zone of stability and security on its eastern borders. On the contrary, these borders Russia appeared with his unpredictable and revanchist policies that began ultimatum to impose their demands and values of the European Union. Putin's victory conquered from

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<sup>5</sup> Azarov: *Widklasty pidpysannja Uhody z ES pro asociaciju vymahala Rosija*, 26 XI 2013, RBK-Ukraina, [www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/politics/otlozhit-podpisanie-sa-s-es-trebovala-rossiya---azarov-26112013154100](http://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/politics/otlozhit-podpisanie-sa-s-es-trebovala-rossiya---azarov-26112013154100) (15.05.2014).

the European part of the cultural space and created the preconditions for return its to Russian Space.

The victory of V. Putin in Vilnius created the necessary conditions for the accession of Ukraine to Russia and thus achieve a critical mass of world power. At the end of his victory Putin pushed away democracy in Europe and expanded the right to maintain and strengthen the authoritarian kleptocratic regimes in the former Soviet Union.

However, as time has shown, this victory for Viktor Yanukovych and V.Putin was Pyrrhic. As Steven Pifer – Senior Fellow, Center for the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, «Putin, maybe beat geopolitical campaign for Ukraine, but it was just one battle, not the war.»<sup>6</sup>. For Putin, who feels laurels winner of the Vilnius summit and had almost Ukraine in the Customs Union, when Ukrainian Euromaydan suddenly nullified this coveted victory. A month after the Vilnius summit Putin became clear that this appeared to be a Pyrrhic victory, since Viktor Yanukovych pressurized Square began to lose power, and therefore can not be the guarantor of Ukraine's joining the Customs Union and the Eurasian, despite off gas and USD 15 billions credit.

Euromaydan become a major threat for both Yanukovych, and for Putin. For Viktor Yanukovych Euromaydan – the threat of loss monopoly of political power in Ukraine. For Putin Euromaydan – the threat of total loss of Ukraine and therefore illusive dreams and super efforts in building a new design of the Russian Empire as a world of a civilization.

Thanks to Euromaydan, the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine all the same it has been signed at the Brussels summit on June 27. However, one may be also confident that **Russia will not stop its efforts to bring to naught all the potential benefits of these agreements for the signatory states, destroying their economies and undermining their sovereignty**<sup>7</sup>.

For Putin, Euromaydan destroyed the opportunity to reconsider the results of the Cold War, reformat World order under russians interests and restore geopolitical dominance in Europe. For Putin Euromaydan became terribly threatened by its own authoritarian regime and regimes like him throughout the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the Kremlin sees on Euromaydan as a challenge to the entire political system of the great Eurasian space that can derail all the geopolitical construction that thoroughly grounded in Russia for 20 years after the collapse of the USSR.

<sup>6</sup> *Kurs na Shid? Prohnozy zahidnyh ekspert iv shthodo Ukrajiny*, 3 I 2014, „Tyzhden.ua”, [www.tyzhden.ua/Society/97792](http://www.tyzhden.ua/Society/97792) (10 VI 2014).

<sup>7</sup> *Council confirmed the EU intention to sign the association agreement with Ukraine, but has not shown a real willingness to defend it*, „International weekly”, 30 VI 2014, nr 1, Foreign Policy Research Institute Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, [www.fpri.kiev.ua/?p=15301&lang=en](http://www.fpri.kiev.ua/?p=15301&lang=en) (6 VII 2014).

For Putin and Russian society this challenge effectively meant the end of his «historic» mission and crash Russians dream of restoring the Great of Russia as a world power – civilization. Obviously stop this historic collapse, they decided to unleashing a war against Ukraine.

Has the strategy of the European Union to Ukraine during this turbulent time for it? Obviously. that the current position of the European Union during the Russian aggression in Ukraine little differs from EU policies in preparation for the Vilnius summit and Euromaydan.

Like before, the EU is trying to use the resolutions and statements to compensate for the lack of real actions. The Union of the richest countries with a half a billion population continues to avoid the responsibility for the fate of the continent, and shows a lack of the clear common foreign policy. It is becoming increasingly understandable that, despite the formidable economic and military opportunities, **the EU has not yet become a global geopolitical player**, and continues to lose and to retreat without the resistance.

And it's not just about the geopolitical competition for the influence in the Eastern Europe, which takes place regardless of the European officials' unwillingness to admit it publicly. The question is whether the EU will continue to indulge the formation of a new fascist-like empire, which might be able soon to return Europe to the Middle Ages<sup>8</sup>.

A few months ago we could talk about the lack of understanding by European officials of the nature of the Russian regime, which is futile to negotiate to without being backed by force. However, the recent statements of the European leaders indicate that now they are fully aware of what Putin's regime is. The question is why in this case, **the EU continues to play the game, imposed by the Kremlin, which famous Russian political analyst Lilia Shevtsova justly named 'the imitation game'**: "The West made a mistake involving into the imitation game with the Kremlin, pretending as if Russia is the same democracy like the other members of the G-8. The West made a huge mistake by letting its politicians, experts and businesses to create on their own territories the machine to launder Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakh criminal money."<sup>9</sup>

**We can assume that there are at least three main reasons of such EU policy: 1) Russian money; 2) European confidence in the own security; 3) indecisiveness of Kyiv.**

Tens of billions euros and dollars from Russia (by the way, this money was previously paid by the Europeans for the Russian oil and gas) do not strengthen

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>9</sup> *Rosijskijj politoloh: Pomylka Zahodu v tomu, shtho vin uvjazavsja v hry imitacii iz kremli-vskoju vladoju*, „Tyzhden.ua”, [www.tyzhden.ua/News/107996](http://www.tyzhden.ua/News/107996) (5 VII 2014).

the European economy much (because exports to Russia is actually a small part of the whole European exports), but enrich a number of European 'experts', advisors, politicians and bureaucrats, including the highest level. Herewith one should keep in mind that in Russia the big business, the state apparatus and the security services compose one integral system. Hardly anyone else except for the Putin knows how many current European leaders will work in Russian companies after the retirement, following the example of the former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.

It is clear that **the leaders of the 'old' Europe believe that their countries will not face the Russian aggression, and therefore they don't want to lose even a few percent of their exports for the sake of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, and even for the sake of the Baltic States.** However, while betraying the Poland in 1939, the French and the British governments were also convinced that Hitler's Germany would not attack them. And it's not about the current intentions of Putin, but about the objective conditions of the Russian economy, which growth had stopped. Therefore Putin's regime will need more and more external victories. And the line, at which the Europe could continue to refrain from interfering, will be crossed much faster than the officials in Brussels, Berlin and Paris hope.

**The unclear policy of the new Ukrainian authorities may also be a significant reason for the passivity of the EU.** The events in Crimea could be somehow explained with Ukraine's unpreparedness to the aggression, but two months of inactivity in Eastern and Southern Ukraine raise many questions about the competence and about the real intentions of Kyiv. Berlin, Paris and London hardly can understand why the state with the hundreds of thousands of the security forces, many of whom had served in 'hot spots' all around the world, can't manage to neutralize one thousand extremists (the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs<sup>10</sup>), most of whom are poorly armed.

**The European Parliament Resolution of 17 April 2014 had to make Kyiv more determined. The EP "expresses its full support for and solidarity with the Government of Ukraine as it seeks to re-establish authority in the occupied cities" and "recalls that the Ukrainian authorities have the full right to use all necessary measures, including the right to self-defence as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter"**<sup>11</sup>. However, the Resolution did not make Kyiv more determined in conducting of the so-called 'anti-terrorist operation'. The

<sup>10</sup> *MWS pidrahuvalo kilnist seperativ i zahoplenyh nimy budivel*, 23 IV 2014, „Ukrajinska Pravda”, [www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/04/23/7023378](http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/04/23/7023378).

<sup>11</sup> *European Parliament resolution of 17 April 2014 on Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries and in particular destabilization of eastern Ukraine*, 17 IV 2014, European Parliament, [www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bTA%2b20140417%2bTOC%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bTA%2b20140417%2bTOC%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN) (12 VII 2014).



separatists continue to capture the cities and the towns, to fire with impunity on the Ukrainian military aircrafts, to seize hostages (including the OSCE inspectors and the staff of the Security Service of Ukraine), and to beat the participants of the meetings in favour of the unity of Ukraine.

On the one hand, it is hard to expect the activity of the EU against the background of such Kyiv's indecision. On the other hand, **if the European Union is going to become a geopolitical power, it has to show more initiative and more persistence, including the communication with its partners.** The official Kyiv would hardly refuse the expert assistance of the EU about the concrete actions to address the current crisis. Shy hints about more decisive action in the EP Resolutions are not the inadequate measures in the situation when the EU opponent is already waging war and is annexing the territories, which had to become a part of the European Union sometime.

The efficiency of the Eastern Partnership summit in Prague on April 24, with the participation of the European Commissioner Štefan Füle was questionable, because three days later, the U.S. Vice President Joe Biden had to convince by phone the Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka to agree on the new sanctions against Russia<sup>12</sup>. It is obviously, that the European capitals lack either the desire or the authority to do the job, which therefore Washington has to do. It is time for the EU to learn how to solve their issues, including the consolidation of the position, when it turns out that some of its members prefer to take the advantages without sacrificing anything for the common good<sup>13</sup>.

Ukrainian crisis, caused by the Russian aggression, has become a test for the solidity of the European Union. Considerable part of the ruling elite in the EU turned out to be unwillingness to actually defend the European values, which they are so fond of talking about. **It becomes apparent that Russia has close ties with a number of European far-right and far-left parties, which widely represented in the European Parliament:** British National Party, Scottish National Party, UK Independence Party, National Front (France), Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang), Freedom Party of Austria, European United Left–Nordic Green Left, Jobbik (Hungary) and others. Possible nominee for President of the European Commission from the GUE/NGL Alexis Tsipras opposes the sanctions

<sup>12</sup> Bajden pohodiv z premeramy Thehji ta Ugorshthyny novi sankcji proty RF, 27 IV 2014, „Ukrajinska Pravda”, [www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/04/27/7023762](http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/04/27/7023762); Thehija ta Slovatthyna ne pidtymajut posylennja sankcij proty Rosiji, 24 IV 2014, „Deutsche Welle”, [www.dw.de/чехия-та-словакия-не-поддерживают-усиления-санкций-против-росии/a-17590292](http://www.dw.de/чехия-та-словакия-не-поддерживают-усиления-санкций-против-росии/a-17590292) (10 VII 2014).

<sup>13</sup> *The EU policy towards Ukraine has not changed since the Euromaidan*, „International weekly”, 2014, nr 7, p. 4, Foreign Policy Research Institute Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, [www.fpri.kiev.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/INTERNATIONAL-WEEKLY-eng-07-18.04.2014-29.04.2014.pdf](http://www.fpri.kiev.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/INTERNATIONAL-WEEKLY-eng-07-18.04.2014-29.04.2014.pdf) (4 VII 2014).

against Russia as well. It is significant that the most of Russia supporters oppose simultaneously all the initiatives aimed at strengthening the institutional unity and energy independence of the European Union and at formation of the common security and defense policy<sup>14</sup>.

The EU response to the **Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk proposal on the creation of the European Energy Union** (which should purchase gas for all the EU member states) will be another 'litmus test' of the EU willingness to make the strategic decisions about its future, not the 'fig leaves' of the ineffective sanctions. The creation of the European Energy Union might deprive Moscow of the possibility to put pressure on the European capitals with gas leverage, provoking the disputes among them. It is obviously, that such Energy Union (if created) should engage to the cooperation the EU partner states also, such as Ukraine, if the latter will not be occupied by Russia by that time<sup>15</sup>.

Unlike France, Poland made the right conclusions from 1939, therefore Poles propose to impose third level sanctions. The **Polish Sejm MP Marcin Svetsitsky**, in his interview to 'Deutsche Welle', expressed the sober idea: **"Russians would not take any negotiations seriously without effective sanctions", so "third level sanctions should be implemented immediately."** Mr. Svetsitsky also believes that Europe should help Ukraine with arms: **"Straight help to the Ukrainian army would be completely legitimate"**<sup>16</sup>.

**It's time for the EU to stop the head in the sand policy of pretending as if Russia is not the aggressor, and as if diplomacy still has a chance without the tougher sanctions on Russia.** European capitals should not hope that Putin will be satisfied only with the Donbas or even with the whole of Ukraine. Two months ago, they hoped that Putin would be satisfied with Crimea, and 76 years ago they believed that Hitler would be satisfied with Austria and Czechoslovakia. Mr. Putin makes no secret of his claims to restore the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, and the boundaries of the USSR's influence in Europe reached the Berlin Wall<sup>17</sup>.

*The article was submitted on 11 July 2014.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ukrainian crisis as a test of the EU solidity*, „International weekly”, 2014, nr 8, p. 2, Foreign Policy Research Institute Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, <http://fpri.kiev.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/INTERNATIONAL-WEEKLY-eng-08-30.04.2014-16.05.2014.pdf> (10 VII 2014).

<sup>15</sup> *The EU policy towards Ukraine has not changed since the Euromaidan*, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> *Pol'skyj deputat: nastav thas serjoznych sankciji proty Rosiji*, 14 VI 2014, „Deutsche Welle”, [www.dw.de/польський-депутат-настав-час-серйозних-санкцій-проти-росії/a-17707348](http://www.dw.de/польський-депутат-настав-час-серйозних-санкцій-проти-росії/a-17707348) (6 VI 2014).

<sup>17</sup> *D-day anniversary as a reflection of the EU ostrich Attitude*, International weekly”, 2014, nr 10, p. 3–4, Foreign Policy Research Institute Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, [www.fpri.kiev.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/INTERNATIONAL-WEEKLY-eng-10-06.06.2014-17.06.2014.pdf](http://www.fpri.kiev.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/INTERNATIONAL-WEEKLY-eng-10-06.06.2014-17.06.2014.pdf) (7 VII 2014).

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Unia Europejska, konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński, kryzys ukraiński, Rosja, Eurmajdan, Polityka Wschodnia UE, Partnerstwo Wschodnie, Strategia UE wobec Ukrainy

## KEYWORDS

European Union, Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ukrainian crisis, Russia, Euromaydan, EU Eastern Policy, Eastern Partnership, Strategy of the EU to Ukraine

## S u m m a r y

***Euromaydan is a test for the EU and call for Russia***

*EU enlargement to the borders of the former Soviet Union posed a problem to him building a new system of relations with the post-sovet countries. Thus, there is a problem in the development of a new strategy for implementation of the EU Eastern Policy. This problem determined by the new historical and political circumstances. Ukrainian crisis, caused by the Russian aggression, has become a test for the solidity of the European Union. Considerable part of the ruling elite in the EU turned out to be unwillingness to actually defend the European values, which they are so fond of talking about.*